Why are Megaprojects, Including Nuclear Power Plants, Delivered
  Overbudget and Late? Reasons and Remedies by Locatelli, Giorgio
1 
 
WHY ARE MEGAPROJECTS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR POWER 
PLANTS, DELIVERED OVERBUDGET AND LATE?  
REASONS AND REMEDIES 
 
 
Dr Giorgio Locatelli  
 
University of Leeds  
g.locatelli@leeds.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please quote this document as: 
 
G. Locatelli, 2018, “Why are Megaprojects, Including Nuclear Power 
Plants, Delivered Overbudget and Late? Reasons and Remedies”, 
Report MIT-ANP-TR-172, Center for Advanced Nuclear Energy Systems 
(CANES), Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
  
2 
 
1 Introduction to the realm of infrastructure megaprojects  
1.1 The Performance of Megaprojects 
Megaprojects are usually defined as projects with budgets above $1 billion that involve a high level of 
innovation and complexity (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003; Locatelli, Mancini, et al. 2014; Merrow 2011; Van 
Wee 2007). However, already in 1985, (Warrack 1985) noted that $1 billion is not a constraint in 
defining megaprojects since sometimes a relative approach is needed. In fact, in some contexts, a 
much smaller project (such as one with a $100 million budget), could constitute a megaproject. 
Similarly, (Hu et al. 2013) claim that a deterministic cost threshold is not appropriate for all countries, 
and a relative threshold such as the GDP should be used instead. According to (Brookes & Locatelli 
2015) "Megaprojects are temporary endeavours (i.e. projects) characterized by large investment 
commitment, vast complexity (especially in organizational terms), and long-lasting impact on the 
economy, the environment, and society". Megaprojects tend to be massive, indivisible, and have long-
term impacts, with investments taking place in waves. Megaprojects’ “effects are felt over many years, 
especially as auxiliary and complementary additions are made” (Miller & Lessard 2001). Public policy 
strongly affects the performance of public megaprojects. In fact, megaprojects “remain under political 
scrutiny well after the final official decision is made. Decisions made early on can have disastrous 
effects when abstract political ambitions crystalize in specific technical challenges” (Giezen 2012). The 
planning and delivery of megaprojects involves a large number of organisations and sometimes 
planning and delivery last longer than the organisations themselves (Brookes et al. 2017). Clearly, 
Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) fit the definition and characteristics of megaprojects. 
Despite their fundamental economic and social role, megaprojects are extremely risky (Locatelli & 
Mancini 2010) and are often implemented after a weak (i.e. often sub-optimal) phase of project 
planning leading to underestimations of the costs and overestimation of short-term benefits (Flyvbjerg 
2006). An analysis of data from 318 industrial megaprojects (Merrow 2011) shows that the vast 
majority of megaprojects might be considered a failure when considering adherence to schedule and 
budget as well as benefits in operation.  Megaprojects are often affected by budget overruns, delays 
in different phases of the project development, and their operating results rarely justify, in the short 
term at least, the implementation of the project (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003)1.  
Table 1 provides an overview of large and mega transportation projects, demonstrating how these 
projects are overbudget all over the world. The cost escalation is common even for long-planned, 
                                                          
1 It is worth noting that authors such as (Dimitriou et al. 2013; Turner & Zolin 2012) are quite critical of Flyvbjerg 
and Merrow’s perspective about the benefits of megaprojects, and stress that they need to be assessed with a 
much longer-term perspective and include a wide range of stakeholders. 
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multi-billion dollar, one-of-a-kind infrastructure projects such as Eurotunnel which increased by 59% 
alone or 69% considering other related projects (Winch 2013).  
Reference Location Sector/Infrastructure Sample Size Average Over budget 
(Flyvbjerg et al. 2016) 
World Roads 863 + 20% 
Hong Kong’s Roads 25 +11% / +6% / -1 % 
(Cantarelli & Flyvbjerg 2015) 
updating 
(Flyvbjerg 2008) 
World 
Rail 58 +45% 
Fixed Link 33 + 34% 
Road 167 + 20% 
(Cantarelli & Flyvbjerg 2015) 
 
Europe 
Rail 23 +34% 
Fixed Links 15 +43% 
Road 143 +22% 
Total 181 +26% 
North America 
Rail 19 +41% 
Fixed Links 18 + 26% 
Road 24 +8% 
Total 61 +24% 
Other geographical 
areas 
Rail 16 +65% 
(Cantarelli et al. 2012) Netherlands 
Road 37 +19% 
Rail 26 + 11% 
Fixed Links 15 + 22% 
(Lee 2008) cited in (Cantarelli et 
al. 2012) 
South Korea 
Road 138 + 11% 
Rail  16 +48% 
Table 1 Review of Large Transportation projects studies.  Extract from (G. Locatelli et al. 2017) 
 
1.2 Reasons for cost escalation/overbudget 
The question of megaprojects often being overbudget and late has been addressed by many 
researchers in the field. Three stand out as major contributors: Bent Flyvbjerg, Edward Merrow and 
Peter E.D. Love. Their views are summarized in this section. 
1.2.1 Perspective of Bent Flyvbjerg  
Bent Flyvbjerg is the Professor and inaugural Chair of Major Programme Management at Oxford 
University's Saïd Business School. (Cantarelli et al. 2010) summarizes the most important arguments 
that have emerged from Flyvbjerg’s studies, e.g. (Flyvbjerg 2006; Flyvbjerg & Molloy 2011; Flyvbjerg 
et al. 2016) as follows: 
 Technical: Forecasting errors including price increases, poor project design, and incomplete 
estimates, scope changes, uncertainty, inappropriate organizational structure etc. 
 Psychological: optimism bias among local officials, the cognitive bias of people, and cautious 
attitudes towards risk. 
 Deliberate underestimation of costs from: 
o Vendors/contractors:  willingness  of vendors to intentionally underestimate the cost and 
overestimate the benefit in order to “sell the projects”. 
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o Political: manipulation of forecasts for starting projects for unethical reasons (e.g. gain 
consensus for the next elections) or corruption phenomena in general (see also (G. 
Locatelli et al. 2017) on this latter point). 
 Poor financing / contract management: poor risk allocation, typically awarding the project (or 
sub-contracts) the lowest priced “turn-key contract” allocating the key risks to contractors that 
might not be able to properly manage them (see for instance the case of concrete in Olikuoto 3 - 
(Ruuska et al. 2009)). 
Deliberate underestimations and psychological reasons are key in Flyvbjerg’s research. However, 
there is an important distinction to make, as clearly presented in (Flyvbjerg 2006) “Psychological and 
political explanations better account for inaccurate forecasts. Psychological explanations account for 
inaccuracy in terms of optimism bias, that is, a cognitive predisposition found with most people to 
judge future events in a more positive light than is warranted by actual experience. Political 
explanations, on the other hand, explain inaccuracy in terms of strategic misrepresentation. Here, 
when forecasting the outcomes of projects, forecasters and managers deliberately and strategically 
overestimate benefits and underestimate costs in order to increase the likelihood that it is their 
projects, and not the competition's, that gain approval and funding. Strategic misrepresentation can 
be traced to political and organizational pressures, for instance, competition for scarce funds or 
jockeying for position. Optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation are both deceptions, but where 
the latter is intentional, i.e., lying, the first is not, optimism bias is self-deception. Although the two 
types of explanation are different, the result is the same: inaccurate forecasts and inflated benefit-cost 
ratios”. 
So according to Bent Flyvbjerg the specific characteristics of each megaproject are rather irrelevant, 
and the overbudget /delay is explained by the stakeholder's attitude toward the project.  
1.2.2 Perspective of Edward Merrow 
Edward Merrow is a leading practitioner, founder and President of Independent Project Analysis, Inc. 
(IPA) and has spent over 35 years studying megaprojects at IPA and the Rand Corporation. According 
to Merrow (2011) the top seven mistakes leading to overbudget and delay in megaprojects are: 
1. Greed 
2. Schedule pressure to reduce construction time and increase the Net Present Value 
3. Poor bidding phase 
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4. Reduction in the upfront cost, leading to poor quality Front End Loading (FEL) and Front End 
Engineering and Design (FEED)2. 
5. Unrealistic cost estimations 
6. Poor risk allocation  
7. Excessive pressure on project manager and “blame culture” 
Merrow (2011)  emphasizes the importance of a very well developed FEL  affirming that “ After 30 
years of showing the data, badgering, cajoling, and whining to the industry about the criticality of FEL, 
I believe there is now virtual consensus among project professionals within the community of industries 
we serve that FEL is the single most important predictive indicator of project success”. 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the quality of the FEL and the cost performance. There is a 
very clear trend showing how FEL is a major determinant of the project performance. If the FEL is 
properly developed, the budget is usually adhered to; if the FEL is poor or is just at a concept phase, 
cost deviation of 50% or more can be expected. A similar discussion can be made for the schedule (i.e. 
the time performance). (Merrow 2011) assesses the quality of the FEL by examining its three phases. 
Phase is 1 is about assessing the “business case”, “team dynamics”, and “alternatives analysis”, each 
of these elements with its own metrics (e.g. market experience). Phases 2 and 3 are about assessing 
“site factors”, “design status”, “project execution plan”, each of these elements with its own metrics, 
more generic in phase 2 (e.g. availability of preliminary soils and hydrology report) and more specific 
in phase 3 (e.g. quality of the information about labor availability, cost and productivity).  
 
Figure 1 Effect of Front End Loading on Project Management performance. Adapted from  (Merrow 2011)  
                                                          
2 Front-end loading (FEL) is generally defined as the process starting from the appraisal of the project 
opportunity, and leading to the development of the project scope and ultimately to the project definition. 
Project definition includes the development of the final feasibility study and front-end engineering design 
(FEED), i.e. the conceptual design of the plant. 
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1.2.3 Perspective of Peter ED Love 
Peter E.D. Love is a John Curtin Distinguished Professor at Curtin University. In his books and papers 
he provides an original perspective on the studies of megaprojects. (Love et al. 2016; Ahiaga-Dagbui 
& Smith 2014) recognize that two predominant schools of thoughts have emerged from the on-going 
discourse on cost overruns: (a) “evolution theorists” who state that overruns are caused by scope 
changes during the development of a project and (b) “psycho strategists” (championed by B. Flyvbjerg) 
who combine psychological contributors and business strategy (such as deception, planning fallacy 
and unjustifiable optimism) to explain the causes of cost overruns. In support of the “psycho 
strategist” point of view (Love et al. 2012) suggests that cost overruns arise as a “result of pathogenic 
influences, which lay dormant within the project system”. 
However, (Love et al. 2016) also stress that optimism bias and strategic misrepresentations alone 
cannot adequately explain why transportation infrastructure projects suffer cost overruns, and the 
evidence presented by the psycho strategists lacks credibility. Therefore, (Love et al. 2015) have 
advocated a more balanced approach that focuses on both processes and technology innovations. 
Notably, (Love et al. 2016) point out the tendency to study independent causes of cost overruns, and 
the lack of investigation of the interdependencies among those causes. To reinforce this argument, 
Love (Love et al. 2016) uses the two and three variable path model as shown in Figure 2 to address 
the “Simpson’s paradox”.  
 
 
Figure 2 Path model demonstrating Simpson’s Paradox. Picture from (Love et al. 2016). BoQ = Bill of Quantities; 
rzx is the “apparent” correlation between “X” and “Z”; pzx is the “real” correlation between “X” and “Z” when the 
mediating element Y is considered; ryx is the “real” correlation between “X” and “Y”; pzy is the “real” correlation 
between “Y” and “Z” 
 
Let us take the example of a tall professional model that is used to walk with high heels every night, 
in any weather condition. If we investigate independently what causes her to fall on a rainy night, we 
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might select the following independent variables: (1) she is a tall professional model, (2) she wears 
high heels, (3) it rained on the night she fell.  
Testing variable (1) independently will make us assume that the fact that she is a tall professional 
model is something that might cause her to fall (part (a) in Figure 2). However, reasonably, it might be 
that it is the combination of variables (1) and (2) (or (1) and (3), or (1), (2) and (3) together) that is 
correlated to the probability of falling (part (b) in Figure 2). 
Considering the nuclear sector, the correlation “Nuclear project” with “Overbudget and delay” might 
be investigated looking at the possible “mediating factors”. E.g. if the mediating factor is “lack 
standardization” (intended both as physical and supply chain, see section 2) the efforts should be 
focused on reducing this “lack of standardization”. In other words, there is nothing wrong with nuclear 
projects “per se”, but the problem lies on how are planned and delivered. 
Therefore Love is more circumspect in explaining the overbudget by people behavior, and it is more 
focused on the scope and content of the project itself. In a nutshell according to Love strategic and 
economic decisions taken for a project influences the way in which an organization processes 
information, which affects the way they manage risk. In the nuclear sector, this relates to what is 
explained in sections 2. 
 
1.2.4 Other perspectives 
Another reason for megaprojects overbudget is the so-called “winner curse”. The winner's curse is “a 
tendency for the winning bid in an auction to exceed the intrinsic value of the item purchased. Because 
of incomplete information, emotions or any other number of factors regarding the item being 
auctioned, bidders can have a difficult time determining the item's intrinsic value. As a result, the 
largest overestimation of an item's value ends up winning the auction” (Investopedia 2017). So, in 
simple terms, the infrastructure that appears to have the most optimistic cost/benefit analysis is 
usually selected. This infrastructure is the “most optimistic”, therefore the one more likely to be 
overbudget/late. 
The problem of budget overruns in megaprojects is systematic with no relevant improvement over 
time. This seems to be an example of “tolerance for deviation” (Pinto 2014), i.e. people within the 
organizations become so accustomed to a deviant behaviour that they do not consider it as deviant 
anymore. Normalization of deviance suggests that the unexpected becomes the expected3. In 
particular, politicians play the necessary “political games” and maintain important contacts to ensure 
broad-based support for the project despite the poor project management performance (Pinto & 
                                                          
3 This concepts applies very well to the nuclear industry in USA and and Europe. Are we really surprised that all 
those plants, none excluded, are overbudget and late? 
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Patanakul 2015). Locatelli’s research (Brookes & Locatelli 2015; Giorgio Locatelli, Mikić, et al. 2017; 
Locatelli, Invernizzi, et al. 2017; Wang et al. 2017; Leurent et al. 2017) also links a series of project 
characteristics to  successful performance in terms of avoidance of delays and cost overruns. The 
project environment, and its legal and socioeconomic characteristics in particular have been identified 
as having an important relationship with megaprojects success. For example, the influence of Special 
Purpose Entities4 (Sainati et al. 2017) is of particular importance for the project management success. 
Recently an empirical analysis of 44 megaprojects (Locatelli, Mikić, et al. 2017) (including 5 nuclear 
projects) delivered in Europe concluded that the successful delivery of megaprojects to be secured, 
projects need to (a) engage better with external stakeholders of the megaproject (and especially 
environmental groups), the affected population and regulators and (b) understand how to make the 
best use of Special Purpose Entities in the governance of megaprojects. 
1.3 Improving the quality of cost estimation: the reference class forecast 
A commonly suggested solution to cure the poor budget forecast (particularly considering optimism 
bias and strategic misinterpretation) is the so-called “reference class forecast” as presented in 
(Flyvbjerg 2006). Reference class forecasting “is a method for systematically taking an outside view on 
planned actions. More specifically, reference class forecasting for a particular project requires the 
following three steps: 
(1) Identification of a relevant reference class of past, similar projects. The class must be broad enough 
to be statistically meaningful but narrow enough to be truly comparable with the specific project. 
(2) Establishing a probability distribution for the selected reference class. This requires access to 
credible, empirical data for a sufficient number of projects within the reference class to make 
statistically meaningful conclusions.  
(3) Comparing the specific project with the reference class distribution, in order to establish the most 
likely outcome for the specific project. 
Thus reference class forecasting does not try to forecast the specific uncertain events that will affect 
the particular project, but instead places the project in a statistical distribution of outcomes from the 
class of reference projects. In statisticians vernacular, reference class forecasting consists of regressing 
forecasters' best guess toward the average of the reference class and expanding their estimate of 
credible interval toward the corresponding interval for the class”. 
                                                          
4 According to (Sainati et al. 2017) a Special Purpose Entity is a fenced organization having limited predefined 
purposes and a legal personality. Special Purpose Entities are often used to design, deliver, finance, and operate 
infrastructural mega-projects. Their relevance lies in the ability to attract finances, manage the risks, and shape 
the governance of the megaproject. Corporate Partnership/Joint Venture, Project Joint Venture, Public Private 
Partnership etc. are usually based on Special Purpose Entities. 
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It is important to stress that the reference class forecast does not aim to reduce the cost of a project 
but to limit the project’s potential for being overbudget by increasing the quality of (and confidence 
in) the cost estimation. Nevertheless, the reference class forecast presents also some limitations 
during its actual application, especially in the case where projects are technically, economically, 
politically and socially complex and very different from one another (e.g. the case of new NPPs with 
different designs from the past), and/or the number of comparable projects is too low (e.g. the case 
of nuclear decommissioning projects). If the projects are not radically different, a modified version of 
the reference class forecast could be done using construction time instead of budget, as mentioned 
in section 2.2. Time comparison is more reliable since monetary values need to be adjusted for 
inflation, financing terms, engineering cost, currency exchange etc. Construction time is a more 
immediate measure of performance. If the NPP design/projects are radically different, the reference 
class forecast method is not applicable. In these cases, benchmarking analysis could be adapted to the 
specific projects characteristics to evaluate their impact on the actual project performance, see for 
example (Invernizzi et al. 2017a; Invernizzi et al. 2017b; Locatelli, Invernizzi, et al. 2017) 
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2 Nuclear power plants as megaprojects 
The previous section reviewed the general topic of megaprojects, with their project management 
performance, their causes and the role of the reference class forecast. These arguments apply to NPPs 
as well. However NPPs, given their size and complexity, are a special type of megaprojects, so further 
considerations are needed.  
2.1 Overbudget and delays in the nuclear sector 
2.1.1 The role of the project size 
NPPs are among the largest type of infrastructure that have been built. ”Largest” here is intended as 
physically massive, with a budget in the range of tens of billions of dollars, and delivery (planning + 
construction) taking up to decades. Examples include: 
 EPR Olkiluoto 3, with a timeline of about 18 years (2000 - TVO application Finnish cabinet for a 
decision-in-principle; operation expected in 2019 (WNN 2017b), final cost unknown but probably 
close to €8.5 billion (Milne 2016); 
 EPR Flamanville 3, with a timeline of about 13 years (October 2005, beginning of the national 
public debate, operation expected in 2019 (WNN 2017a)), a final budget above €10 billion (EDF 
2015); 
 AP1000: costs to build the two Vogtle units could range between $18.3 billion and $19.8 billion 
(Patel 2017). The AP1000 units in Virgil C. Summer have comparable budget, and the projects are 
currently (September 2017) suspended ; 
So, surely the construction of a GWe scale NPP can be considered as a megaproject, and surely one of 
the “largest megaproject”. The key issue is that the larger the project, the greater is the likelihood to 
be over budget and experience  a delay. Indeed, this fact is supported by several empirical studies as 
explained next, and it is a key determinant for the performance of nuclear projects.  
Regarding the correlation of size with overbudget, one of the most holistic and recent studies (Ansar 
et al. 2014) analyzed the budget and schedule performance of 245 large dams, built between 1934 
and 2007, on five continents, in 65 different countries. It was found that 3 out of 4 large dams suffered 
cost overruns and delays. Actual costs were on average 96% higher than estimated costs; the median 
was 27%. This large difference between the average and median suggests that a few megaprojects 
were enormously overbudget, but probably also that they were outliers, and a more “moderate” 
overbudget is common (see Table 1). Differences among regions are not significant. Project type (e.g., 
hydropower, irrigation, or multi-purpose dam) or wall type (earth fill, rock fill, concrete arch, etc.) did 
not influence the cost overruns. Irrespective of the year or decade in which a dam was built, there 
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were no significant differences in forecasting errors, implying little learning from past mistakes. Quite 
remarkably, the only statistical significance is that the level of cost overruns increases with dam size 
measured either by installed hydropower generation or wall height. Similar results were found for the 
schedule.  
The analysis of a dataset of 401 power plants and transmission projects in 57 countries, showed that 
only 39 projects across the entire sample experienced no cost overrun (Sovacool, Nugent, et al. 2014). 
Later, the same authors (Sovacool, Gilbert, et al. 2014a) have shown that technologies usually 
delivered as megaprojects are most likely to be over budget, in fact, “Hydroelectric dams and nuclear 
reactors have the greatest amount and frequency of cost overruns, even when normalized to overrun 
per installed MW […] solar and wind projects seem to present the least construction risk.” The idea 
that the bigger the project, the more likely it was to have a budget overrun was found to be statistically 
significant even in (Sovacool, Gilbert, et al. 2014b). (Brookes & Locatelli 2015) analysed a sample of 12 
energy megaprojects and investigated the project characteristics that correlated with the project 
performance. Again, the construction of nuclear NPPs (the largest type of project in the sample) 
strongly correlates with budget overruns and have the largest cost overrun. 
 
2.1.2 The role of the project complexity 
Project complexity (technical and organizational) is another major determinant of overbudget and 
delay in the nuclear sector. (Locatelli, Mancini, et al. 2014) investigated the role of complexity in 
megaprojects, highlighting that underperforming projects are often delivered in a project 
environment characterized by: 
1. rapid changes of technologies; shortened technology cycle time; increased risks of obsolescence 
(Hanratty et al. 2002); 
2. increasingly interoperable and interdependent systems (Jaafari 2003); 
3. emphasis on cost reduction, with tight schedules and without quality or scope reduction (Laufer et 
al. 1996); 
4. integration issue: high number of system parts and organizations involved (Calvano & John 
2004)(Locatelli & Mancini 2010); 
5. combining multiple technical disciplines (Ryan & Faulconbridge 2005); 
6. competitive pressures from other technologies within the same market (CCGT vs nuclear) or other 
designs within the same technology (Kossiakoff et al. 2011).  
These six elements are typical for technically complex projects, element 1 being the exception for 
nuclear. With this background and the guidelines of (GAPPS 2007), (Locatelli, Mancini, et al. 2014) 
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further defined a metric they termed “complex project context”, i.e. where the complexity is not only 
technical, but also organizational in the “project delivery chain”. Specific characteristics include: 
• several key distinct disciplines, methods, or approaches involved in performing the project; 
• strong legal, social, or environmental implications from performing the project; 
• usage of most of partner's resources (both tangible and intangible); 
• the strategic importance of the project to the organization or organizations involved; 
• stakeholders with conflicting needs regarding the characteristics of the product of the 
project; and 
• high number and variety of interfaces between the project and other organizational entities. 
All these aspects have major influence on the project governance (Müller 2009)  since “managerial 
rationalities are limited in understanding their own complex project realities which are themselves 
bound by limits imposed by overall governance structures and strategies” (van Marrewijk et al. 2008). 
Therefore the planning and delivery of NPPs is surely complex, where complexity is intended to 
encompass both technical/physical and organizational aspects of the project. 
The first layer of complexity is technical/physical complexity, as NPPs are characterized as big 
engineering challenges and involve a diversity of disciplines5. An NPP project includes nuclear 
engineering (that is mostly peculiar for this type project), but also, civil, electrical, I&C, mechanical, 
hydraulic, materials, etc. Outside engineering, there are challenges of physics, geology, human-
machine interaction, cyber security etc.  
The second layer of complexity is organisational. NPPs , by nature, are subject to very strict and unique 
regulations, that have many undesirable effects, e.g. increasing the complexity and cost of the supply 
chain. The organizational complexity also comes from the political involvement, since nuclear energy 
can be a very sensitive topic in the public discourse. NPPs require specific skills that need to be 
maintained and developed, e.g. through academia and training. Moreover, the financing itself is a 
major issue since the development of an NPP project is a very risky project with capital in the range of 
billions invested with no revenue generation for at least 5 years and more typically a decade. It is a 
challenge to find investors with such a large amount of financial resources and risk appetite.  
 
                                                          
5 There are very few projects with comparable complexity. Examples might be the space missions or large fusion 
experiments, other sectors very well known for their Project Management issues (regarding fusion, see the 
recent case of the ITER experimental reactor) 
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2.2 Application of the reference class forecast to the nuclear sector 
An application of the reference class forecast to the nuclear sector is presented in (Locatelli & Mancini 
2012). In this paper, the authors investigated the case of Olkiluoto 3 and Flamanville 3 and 
benchmarked these NPPs against historical data.  
In both cases, the projects have significantly underestimated the time and the resources required to 
complete construction. While the failure to reach construction targets may be due to FOAK (First of A 
Kind) effects that are hard to predict, failure to set targets may also have been due to the unjustified 
optimism in the process to reach the target. To  gauge the realism of the targets used in Flamanville 3 
and Olkiluoto 3, it is useful to apply reference forecasting in order to evaluate the gap between 
planned and actual cost and schedule data of the project. The construction of EPR was expected to 
take about 5 years for Flamanville 3 and Olkiluoto 3. (Grubler 2010) clearly shows that an increase in 
size increases the construction time, and the EPR is bigger than any other NPP. Moreover, the EPR is 
based on the German NPP “Konvoi” and the French NPP “N4”. The decision to develop and build the 
N4 NPP was the most problematic of the entire French PWR (Pressurised Water Reactors) program: 
the new NPPs faced numerous technical difficulties, substantial delays, and by French standards 
prohibitive cost overruns. Not a single N4 NPP was exported. Focusing on these NPPs, Table 2 and 
Figure 3 show that the initial forecasts for the EPR projects were too optimistic when compared to 
previous values of NPPs built in France. The previous reference NPPs were completed in about 10 
years, and they had been built during the “golden age” of NPP when the entire French project delivery 
chain was gaining more and more experience in the construction of a number of nuclear NPPs, and 
FOAK effects were therefore minimised. The new EPRs are bigger, more complex and built using 
inexperienced supply chains. Nevertheless, the initial forecast was a 50% reduction in the schedule: 
both forecasts for Flamanville 3 and Olkiluoto 3 demonstrated an optimism bias. It is clear that the 
actual values match the historical performance, as expected with a “reference class” forecast. 
 
State NPPs Name Type Location Net Capacity Construction 
Started 
Commercial 
Operation 
TOTAL Const 
time [years] 
France CHOOZ-B-1 N4 ARDENNES 1500 01/01/1984 15/05/2000                    16.4  
France CHOOZ-B-2 N4 ARDENNES 1500 31/12/1985 29/09/2000                    14.8  
France CIVAUX-1 N4 VIENNE 1495 15/10/1988 29/01/2002                    13.3  
France CIVAUX-2 N4 VIENNE 1495 01/04/1991 23/04/2002                    11.1  
Germany BROKDORF (KBR) Konvoi BROKDORF 1410 01/01/1976 22/12/1986                    11.0  
Germany PHILIPPSBURG-2 (KKP 2) Konvoi PHILIPPSBURG 1402 07/07/1977 18/04/1985                       7.8  
Germany ISAR-2 (KKI 2) Konvoi ISAR 1410 15/09/1982 09/04/1988                       5.6  
Finland Olkiluoto 3 EPR Olkiluoto 1650 12/08/2005 15/05/2019                    13.8  
France Flamanville 3 EPR Flamanville 1650 03/12/2007 01/11/2019                    11.9  
Table 2 Construction time for EPR NPPs in Europe. Historical data from IAEA PRIS database 
www.iaea.org/pris/ forecast  (WNN 2017b) for Olkiluoto 3 and (WNN 2017a) for Flamanville 3 
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Figure 3 Application of reference cast forecast. Updated from (Locatelli & Mancini 2012) using (WNN 2017b) for 
Olkiluoto 3 and (WNN 2017a) for Flamanville 3 
 
2.3 Potential approaches for cost reduction 
2.3.1 Economy of multiples 
The economy of multiples is achieved when the same identical plant (e.g. an NPP) is delivered more 
than one time, and ideally several times. Economy of multiples in the construction of NPP is somehow 
rooted in the idea of “mass production”, a concept born in the automotive industry and later adopted 
in other fields, like aerospace (e.g. the production of aircraft), IT (e.g. the production of computers 
and smartphones) or even the food industry (e.g. the production of ready meals). For NPP, the 
economy of multiples is achieved because of two key factors: the learning process and the co-siting 
economy. 
2.3.1.1 Learning process 
Learning economies result from the replicated supply of plant components by the suppliers and from 
the replicated construction and operation of the plant by the utilities and their contractors. Therefore, 
the unit cost of an Nth-of-A-Kind (NOAK) plant is less than a First-of-A-Kind (FOAK). The learning 
process reduces the cost of equipment, material and work. However, another result from learning is 
the reduction in the construction schedule. As shown in (Locatelli, Bingham, et al. 2014), the 
construction schedule is another very critical economic aspect in an NPP for two reasons: 
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1. Fixed daily cost. On a construction site, there are thousands of people working and the 
utilization of expensive equipment (e.g. cranes). Consequently, each working day has high 
fixed costs. 
2. The postponing of cash in-flow. Due to the postponing of cash in-flow, there are two 
negative effects. First, each year of construction delays the the time when cash is expect to 
flow into the utility increasing the interest to be paid on the debt. Second, the present value 
of future cash flow decreases exponentially with time. 
2.3.1.2 Co-siting economies 
Small plants allow the investors to make incremental capacity additions on a pre-existing site. This 
leads to co-siting economies: the set-up activities related to siting (e.g. acquisition of land rights, 
connection to the transmission network) have been already carried out; certain fixed indivisible costs 
can be saved when installing the second and subsequent units. The larger the number of NPP co-sited 
units, the smaller the total investment costs for each unit  (Carelli et al. 2008; Carelli et al. 2010; Carelli, 
Petrovic & Mycoff 2007). Operational costs would also be reduced because of sharing of personnel 
and spare parts across multiple units (Carelli, Petrovic, Mycoff, et al. 2007) or the possibility to share 
the cost of upgrades on multiple units, e.g. the cost of upgrading software. 
In the literature, there are many statements about co-siting economies. For example (IAEA 2005) 
suggests that “the average cost for identical units on the same site can be about 15% lower than the 
cost of a single unit, with savings coming mostly in siting and licensing costs, site labour and common 
facilities. The 58 PWR in France built as multiple units at 19 sites are good examples.” A similar more 
recent example is the new 4-unit NPP at the Barakah site in the UAE: Unit 4 is costing some 20-25% 
less than Unit 1; schedule is the same by choice because the owner and operator wishes to put the 
units in operation at a rate of one unit per year (PC 2017). There are a number of significant benefits 
that could also accrue to a cluster of co-sited small NPP: consistent site output as NPPs are sequentially 
shut down for maintenance and refuelling; high utilization of expensive remote handling equipment; 
smaller components for transport and storage, meaning also more efficient use of hot cells; greater 
availability of spare parts and components; etc. 
2.3.2 Modularisation and off-site fabrication 
A number of papers and reports explain the costs and benefits of modularization. Most of these 
references are qualitative, like the recent review of modularization in the nuclear industry (Upadhyay 
& Jain 2016). A detailed assessment developed in the product industry, but adaptable to industrial 
plants is presented in (Ripperda & Krause 2017). In general modularization is the process of converting 
the design and construction of a monolithic plant into a plant that facilitates factory fabrication of 
modules for shipment and installation in the field as complete assemblies (GIF/EMWG 2007). Factory 
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fabrication is usually cheaper than site fabrication, but the costs associated with shipping of modules 
to the site must also be considered. Smaller plants can take a better advantage of modularity since it 
is possible to have a greater percentage of factory-made components. 
In the nuclear sector, (Hayns & Shepherd 1991; Schock et al. 2001) were the first authors to illustrate 
why the technical solutions that are embodied by the small plant design might reduce the investment 
cost, for a given plant. The most relevant elements of the small plant concept are the standardization 
of components and a broader safety by design approach. Standardization is at the origin of a more 
efficient supply, construction and operation (see (Langlois 2002) for a general discussion of the effects 
of standardization through design modularity) and it enables suppliers and utilities to more rapidly 
benefit the learning economies (David & Rothwell 1996). Although there are a number of works in the 
literature describing the qualitative advantages of modularization and prefabrication, only a few of 
them are able to quantify the underlying economic advantage. 
A key document is (De La Torre 1994) that reviewed the work done at that time. However, the basis 
for the analyses are not always transparent and seems to rely more on the perception of the experts 
involved than on actual facts.  
About construction costs: 
 (Tatum 1987) state that it has been estimated that the modular engineering concept can save up 
to 10% of the total cost of a facility, cut on site labour by 25 %, and reduce the plot [working] area 
by 10% to 50 %; 
 (Hesler 1990) states that "in-depth studies have shown that modular power plants show capital 
cost savings of 20 % or more and schedule savings approaching 40 %”. 
 (Parkingson & Short 1982) shows examples of reduced costs through modular construction and 
that John Brown of John Brown Engineers & Constructors, Inc. stated that savings of at least 7% 
of the total contract amount was obtained by using modular construction methods rather than 
conventional methods for over 40 % of the process facilities for the Sullom Voe Oil Terminal in the 
Shetland Islands;  
 (Shelley 1990) shows that in some cases, a reduction of capital costs by up to 20 % is possible. 
Most modular construction experts would agree that modular construction can save between 5 
% and 10% of the total cost for most projects. 
If construction cost can be reduced, the engineering, management and transportation costs might 
increase. (Glaser et al. 1979) state that the additional man hours required for design and engineering 
of a modular construction project increase the design and engineering cost by approximately 10%. 
Because of the effort needed to evaluate and select vendors, fabricators, and fabrication shops, and 
to administer contracts, the cost associated with procurement increases by 20% in modular 
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construction projects, while the costs of the fabrication and transportation activities increase by 
approximately 17% and 13 %, respectively.  
Similarly (Kliewer 1983) cited an engineering cost increase of 15 %, while (Shelley 1990) states that 
the transportation cost is about 1-2 % of the value of the module. (Hesler 1990) explains that the 
engineering costs involved in the first modular construction project are usually greater because of 
inexperience. In particular, the first modular design "can be 50-60% more than conventional 
construction design, particularly if the job is done well. This, of course, is only 50-60% more (than 
conventional construction design) or 12% of the total installed cost." However, (De La Torre 1994) 
concludes that despite the increased cost listed above, most modular construction projects show 
savings in installed costs over conventional construction. 
A detailed academic study is presented by (Lapp & Golay 1997). The authors developed an analytical 
method, and the results of the analyses indicate a typical potential savings of 15% in the capital cost 
of the modular NPP versus a conventional one.  
Thus, in summary, from relatively old work it seems that a target saving of 15%-20% in total installed 
cost is reasonable, even if there are higher up-front costs associated with engineering.  
More recently (Eftimie 2016) focused on offshore facilities. According to the data owned by the author 
“Standardization allows re-using same design across many different projects in a scalable, 
interchangeable and safe way, reducing direct project time and costs (E&C) by 20% or more, […]  
Reduced schedule (up to 25-50%): yard fabrication allows early procurement of critical equipment and 
maximized parallel works (workshop vs field civil work/site preparation); yard work can start before 
obtaining a site permit. Short schedules are important when required to market products rapidly […] 
The engineering module concept has both positive and negative aspects. Among the negative issues 
the most important is the cost of first design, which can exceed that of the conventional design up to 
50-60% more (or reaching up to 12% of the [Total investment cost]) depending on familiarity and 
modular past experience of the contractor.”  
A specific case study is the (General Dynamics Electric Boat 2017). Electric Boat is the prime contractor 
and lead design yard for the U.S. Navy's Virginia-class attack submarines. This submarine uses a 30 
MW NPP. According to the company “Improvements in construction performance will reduce 
construction span from 84 months to 60 months. This is being achieved through greater use of modular 
construction, pushing as much work as possible into a manufacturing setting where it can be done 
more efficiently. “ 
In a recent paper (Maronati et al. 2017) developed a methodological approach (called EVAL) that using 
data such as the plant design and construction time, provide a target cost saving with the 
modularization. The authors applied the module to the Westinghouse SMR (Small modular reactors) 
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and the authors identified possible savings for total capital investment cost in the region of 15% -  42%. 
However the authors did quite optimistic assumptions, for instance “The investment required to 
design and develop a supply chain for the SMR under consideration was not considered […] The 
assumption that no limitation is present in the offsite factories production capabilities was made. 
Factories were assumed to be capable of producing the exact number of modules needed on site at 
any time, i.e. there is no constraint on the degree of parallelism allowed in the fabrication stage. Inputs 
for strategy two are the same as those of strategy one.”  Economy of multiples and Modularisation 
might contribute to balance the diseconomy of scale in SMR (Trianni et al. 2009). 
Despite the optimism in these papers recent experiences with the AP1000 showed as the “modules 
supply chain” can be a major source for delays, see for instance the case of the reactor coolant pumps 
(WNN 2015) and in general the issues of managing the quality along the supply chain (Hals & Flitter 
2017). However these are the first AP1000 units, and perhaps the cost saving would become evident 
in the following units while the design and project delivery chain develop toward the NOAK. 
 
2.4 The role of the project delivery chain and regulations 
Nuclear experts and empirical data show that the Korean nuclear programme is probably one of the 
most successful. Indeed the standard Korean 1 GWe NPP is consistently built in South Korea within 5-
6 years, and the fleet has one of the highest capacity factors in the world. The Koreans established a 
“project delivery chain” to deliver a “nuclear programme”(i.e. several, almost identical, NPPs) rather 
than individually commissioned NPP. Most of the time, the architect/engineer and the subcontractors 
were able to deliver the NPPs on time and on budget. In large projects, especially in the nuclear field, 
a key strategy to achieve good performances appears to be the standardization of the project delivery 
supply chain and NPP design. In addition to standardization (Choi et al. 2009) summarize a number of 
lessons to explain the success of the Korean experience: 
• integration of extensive knowledge and experiences; 
• strong national commitment to the NPP programme; 
• continuous investment in the infrastructure with government leadership; 
• localization through technology transfer (as discussed above); 
• clear definition of responsibilities and rights in the NPP construction. 
 
A clear contribution to the success of a nuclear programme is played by the regulator. Sadly famous 
is the role that regulation played in the USA when most of the plants were built during the 60s-80s. 
(Hultman et al. 2007) shows that the changing regulatory environment was a determinant for cost 
increases. More explicitly “the case of nuclear power has been seen largely as an exception that reflects 
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the idiosyncrasies of the regulatory environment as public opposition grew, regulations were 
tightened, and construction times increased […]The Gen-IV process hopes to avoid cost overruns by 
integrating standardized reactor designs with tighter regulatory approval timelines. It remains to be 
seen whether this goal can be achieved without the construction of many reactors of each type. After 
the accident at [Three Mile Island] in 1979, the industry was subjected to intense regulatory scrutiny 
and evaluation. As a result, the overall fleet capacity factor—the net generation for all reactors in the 
set divided by the maximum possible generation of all reactors in the set—dropped precipitously and 
reached its nadir in 1982 at 52.9%.” 
Different from any other industrial activity, nuclear power is characterized by a strong governmental 
involvement due to the need for an opportune infrastructure (IAEA 2007) for both the acquisition or 
selling of nuclear facilities. Indeed, most of the principles governing the licensing processes are 
internationally recognized (IAEA 2002), but the application of these is deeply influenced by the 
national legal traditions and by nuclear program strategies underpinned at the country level. This 
differentiation is one of the most influencing factors that affect both the environment complexity and 
the risk from the NPP vendors and the investors’ point of view. The lack of an international 
harmonization of “rules” is one of the greatest obstacles to the development of standardization in the 
nuclear industry worldwide. The risk derived from the licensing delays or no acceptance (which most 
of the time implies the modification of the NPP design) is especially high because the financial nature 
of the NPPs, which are capital intensive projects (AREVA 2006). In the 40-80’s, the safety framework 
was mostly developed at the country level. As a result, few nuclear practices were in common between 
countries. After the Chernobyl accident a fundamental change of thinking was made, by governments 
and citizens, because the detrimental trans-boundary nature of the nuclear incidents was recognized 
(IAEA 2002); so an international safety framework was considered. Only after some years, the first 
Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS I) was developed and implemented, and now it is adopted by 
almost all nuclear countries (IAEA 2010); the implementation of the CNS I was a fundamental 
milestone because for the first time the licensing functions where internationally recognized (article 
7.2) and a general safety framework was established; the technical provisions of the CNS I are: 
legislation and regulation (Art: 7-9), general safety consideration (Art: 10-16) and safety of the 
installation (Art: 17-19).  
However, in spite of agreement on these general principles, the licensing framework is still different 
between the nations.  
An analysis of the licensing challenge to deploy SMR is presented in (Sainati et al. 2015). Key points 
are: 
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 The type of licensing approach is a fundamental determinant for the deployment of SMRs. At this 
stage of development, the “goal setting approach” seems the most favorable to the deployment 
for SMR. Conversely, most of the countries involved (as NPP vendor, buyer or both) in an SMR 
nuclear program adopt a prescriptive based licensing approach.  
 The existing licensing processes have been developed having implicitly in mind GWe scale NPPs 
that have multi-billions budget and 5-10 years construction. Therefore the licensing process could 
extend the construction time of SMRs beyond the pure technical schedule undermining the overall 
economics. 
 As aforementioned, the fragmentation at country level of legal systems and jurisprudence, 
institutional systems, licensing process structure all constrain the NPP standardization. Since each 
country has jurisdiction only on itself, a short-term harmonization is unlikely. 
 The idea of “NPP certified in the factory” is still far away from practice. Even if all the “mechanical 
components” of an NPP are certified in the factory, the licensing process applies to another unit 
of analysis: the system installed at the site. The nuclear operator is in all cases the ultimate and 
sole responsible party for nuclear safety. 
 An ad-hoc legislation process similar to the one for research reactors could be the way forward. 
However, there could be constraints in terms of public acceptability, and total power capacity 
installed at the site. Research reactors are designed as stand-alone systems, not duplicated at site 
and (usually) produce limited or no power. 
In conclusion, the project delivery chain is a key determinant of the success of megaprojects. In 
particular, for the nuclear sector, standardisation and regulation/licensing are the foremost topic that 
needs to be considered. 
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3 Conclusions 
Megaprojects are often delivered overbudget and late. Their size is a key driver, being directly 
correlated with the likelihood and magnitude of their overbudget and delay. NPPs are not an 
exception to this rule, and currently, all NPPs under construction in Europe and USA are delivered 
overbudget and late. However, the nuclear technology is not to blame, for example, in South Korea 
NPPs are delivered on time & within the budget and have very good operational performance. The 
reasons for this success can be found in the project delivery chain. NPPs or any other type of 
megaprojects are likely to be delivered overbudget and late when the project is a complex “one-of-
its-kind white elephant” combining a novel complex technology with a complex network of 
stakeholders. This combination of novelty and complexity make the megaproject fragile, i.e. it is likely 
that something will go wrong and the project will be very difficult to recover.  
The proven way to address this issue is standardisation, which played a key role in the South Korea 
success. Standardization needs to be twofold: the technical standardisation, i.e. the construction of 
the infrastructure with the same (or very similar) design over and over, and the “project delivery 
chain” standardisation, i.e. the same stakeholders involved in the delivery of a project that is replicable 
multiple times. Under this perspective (SMRs), given their size, are an ideal power plant for several 
countries. Yet, if the economy of scale is the only driver considered, SMRs are hardly competitive with 
large NPPs (and with gas or coal power plants). However, a fleet of standard SMRs might balance the 
“diseconomy of scale” with the “economy of multiples.” The delivery of several standardised SMR 
projects might be the key to achieving good project management performances in the nuclear sector. 
The deployment of SMRs, however, faces a number of challenges from the licencing, supply chain and 
financing perspective. These challenges might be enormous, but so too are the potential rewards.  
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